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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many litigants have found the First Amendment
to be a useful tool. One could mention pornography actors, tattoo ar-
tists, death row inmates, and corporate interests from small photog-
raphy shops to meat trade associations to cigarette manufacturers
to pharmaceutical companies. All have raised First Amendment
claims in the last few years, and nearly all of them have met with
some level of success. 
These claims are examples of what has been called First Amend-
ment opportunism, where litigants raise novel free speech claims
that may involve the repackaging of other types of legal arguments.1
To the extent that many such claims have succeeded in the courts,
they are also examples of what I will call First Amendment expan-
sionism, where the First Amendment’s territory pushes outward to
encompass ever more areas of law. Here, I will consider one recent
case that epitomizes both phenomena. What explains them, how-
ever, is another matter. Although many forces contribute to both
First Amendment opportunism and First Amendment expansion-
ism, the two phenomena may say something about the nature of
speech and the nature of rules.
I. THE CASE
In 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia decided National Association of Manufacturers v. Nation-
al Labor Relations Board.2 In 2011, the National Labor Relations
1. See Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE
SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 174, 176 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey Stone eds., 2002).
2. 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Some months after the symposium of which this piece
was a part, the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, issued a ruling in another case in which it stated
that to the extent that the holding of National Association of Manufacturers conflicted with
the en banc court’s reasoning, it was overruled. Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760
F.3d 18, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The court forbore, however, to opine on how much of a conflict
there actually was between the two cases. See id. at 22 n.1. And elsewhere in its opinion the
court distinguished National Association of Manufacturers. See id. at 27. More important than
this internal confusion is the fact that the questions raised by both National Association of
Manufacturers and American Meat Institute remain open at the Supreme Court level and in
many other circuits. However when one reads the two cases together, the issues they raise
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Board (Board) issued the so-called Notice Posting Rule, which
required most private sector employers to display within the work-
place a poster describing employees’ workplace rights under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA).3 The poster stated, for example,
that employees have the right to organize or join a union, to bargain
collectively, to discuss wages and conditions with coworkers or a
union, to take action to improve working conditions, and to choose
to do none of these things.4 The poster also identified some rules
that the NLRA places on employer conduct and union conduct.5 
The government rested its justification for the rule on the fact
that the Board cannot initiate enforcement of the NLRA on its own,
but instead requires a charge first to be filed by a third party, such
as an employee, employer, or union.6 Posting the principle compo-
nents of the NLRA was justified because “[e]nforcement of the
NLRA ... depend[s] on the existence of outside actors who are not
only aware of their rights but also know where they may seek to
vindicate them within appropriate timeframes.”7
The National Association of Manufacturers, a trade group, chal-
lenged the Notice Posting Rule, arguing that it violated the First
Amendment rights of employers.8 The District Court held that the
Notice Posting Rule did not violate the First Amendment because it
“d[id] not compel employers to say anything.”9 Rather, the poster
constituted speech on the part of the government.10
The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that the Notice Posting Rule
violated the speech rights of employers.11 The court relied on a line
remain important and unfinished.
3. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 717 F.3d at 950 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 104.202(a) (2013)).
4. Id.
5. Id. The full poster is available at http://perma.cc/B9N7-LWHJ.
6. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 717 F.3d at 951.
7. Id. (quoting Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act,
76 Fed. Reg. 54,010 (Aug. 30, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104)).
8. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 846 F.Supp. 2d 34, 58 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The group also argued that the Board lacked the au-
thority to promulgate the rule under the NLRA. Id. at 43.
9. Id. at 58.
10. Id.
11. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 717 F.3d at 959. Technically, the court determined that the rule
was inconsistent with section 8(c) of the NLRA, which provides:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be
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of so-called “compelled speech” cases, beginning with West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, in which the Supreme Court
held that requiring public school students to recite the Pledge of
Allegiance violated the First Amendment.12 The court concluded
that the Notice Posting Rule could not be distinguished from Bar-
nette.13 Like the Pledge of Allegiance in Barnette, the employment
notice was speech that the employer had to communicate whether
it wanted to or not.14 As in Barnette, “the government selected the
message and ordered its citizens to convey that message.”15 Thus, as
in Barnette, the requirement had to be struck down.16
II. THE CONTROVERSY
Let us pause at the D.C. Circuit’s assertion that requiring em-
ployers to post accurate information about the laws governing the
employment relationship cannot be distinguished from requiring
schoolchildren to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Many lawyers, and
indeed many laymen, would say these cases are eminently distin-
guishable. One could point to the fact that the workplace is different
from other contexts. Both employers and employees play roles that
often have little to do with their personal passions, and the
workplace is heavily regulated for health, safety, and other reasons.
One could point to the fact that labor relations are also heavily
regulated. One could argue that the realm of commerce generally is
different from the realm of politics at issue in Barnette. One could
note that the Pledge of Allegiance amounts to an affirmation of
personal political belief (“I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United
evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this [Act], if
such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2012). Citing a Supreme Court opinion describing section 8(c) as “imple-
ment[ing] the First Amendment,” the D.C. Circuit relied upon First Amendment case law to
strike down the Notice Posting Rule. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 717 F.3d at 955 (quoting Chamber
of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 67 (2008)).
12. 319 U.S. 624 (1943); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 717 F.3d at 957.
13. Id. (referring to Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, and Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977),
“We do not think these, and other such cases may be distinguished from this one on the
Board’s terms”).
14. Id. at 958.
15. Id. at 957.
16. Id. at 959.
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States of America”),17 whereas the Notice Posting Rule merely re-
quires the employer to restate facts about the actual law governing
the employment relationship.18 Many people would say that a per-
sonal oath and a restatement of the law are quite different forms of
communication, and that this makes them more different than their
both happening to be made of words makes them the same.
Moreover, although established First Amendment law may not
reflect everyone’s intuitions on every topic, it offers plenty of support
for the view that the Notice Posting Rule and the Pledge of Alle-
giance are not as one. First Amendment law treats labor relations
as essentially a unique realm in which many general free speech
principles do not apply.19 Courts have recognized that the employ-
ment context permits many forms of regulation that would receive
different analysis in other realms.20 This includes the fact that
employers may have duties to disclose certain information to em-
ployees, whether regarding health and safety or other aspects of the
work environment.21 First Amendment law has also treated com-
mercial speech differently from other speech,22 and has treated laws
17. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
18. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 717 F.3d at 950.
19. See, e.g., UAW–Labor Emp’t & Training Corp. v. Chao, 325 F.3d 360, 365 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (“[A]n employer’s right to silence is sharply constrained in the labor context, and leaves
it subject to a variety of burdens to post notices of rights and risks.”); see also Henry I. Siegel
Co. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d 1206, 1216 (6th Cir. 1969) (upholding required labor posting by em-
ployer, with some court-ordered modifications); NLRB v. M.E. Blatt Co., 143 F.2d 268, 274-75
(3d Cir. 1944) (taking for granted that the Board could require employers to post notices that
they would not discourage employees’ labor rights and concluding that employers had no First
Amendment right to post their own notices that the Board found coercive).
20. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (defining standards for
Title VII hostile workplace environment sexual harassment while ignoring First Amendment
briefing from both parties); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (suggesting
that regulation of sexual harassment speech under Title VII does not raise First Amendment
problems); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First
Amendment Dog That Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 9 (“After Harris, however, it is
virtually inconceivable that the Supreme Court might hold that the First Amendment forbids
the imposition of Title VII liability for a broad category of sexually harassing speech.”).
21. See, e.g., Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding
a hazard-labeling law against a First Amendment challenge); Stockwell Mfg. Co. v. Usery, 536
F.2d 1306, 1309 (10th Cir. 1976) (upholding required posting of poor OSHA safety reviews);
Lake Butler Apparel Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 519 F.2d 84, 89 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding required
posting of OSHA notices); Fogle v. H & G Rest., Inc., 654 A.2d 449, 463 (Md. 1995) (upholding
required posting of smoking notices against First Amendment challenge).
22. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
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requiring speech about commerce differently from laws restricting
communication about commerce.23 More generally, First Amend-
ment law has distinguished between compelled speech of the
Barnette variety and compelled disclosure of uncontroversial factual
statements, which should receive minimal scrutiny.24 
In fact, in an earlier case, UAW-Labor Employment & Training
Corp. v. Chao, the D.C. Circuit denied that employers had a free
speech right not to post a different government mandated notice
informing employees of certain labor rights.25 In rejecting the free
speech claim, the court said:
[A]n employer’s right to silence is sharply constrained in the
labor context, and leaves it subject to a variety of burdens to post
notices of rights and risks. Thus the dissent understandably
offers no argument that employers’ silence as to [employee]
rights is in fact protected (or even arguably protected).26
A court could, in short, easily distinguish the Notice Posting Rule
from the Pledge of Allegiance. But the D.C. Circuit did not. It is this
fact that makes National Association of Manufacturers so indicative
of current trends in First Amendment law. This is, to many, an easy
case—an easy case in favor of the Notice Posting Rule. If anything,
as the D.C. Circuit itself suggested in Chao, the hard part may be
forming an understanding of the First Amendment under which the
Notice Posting Rule is unconstitutional. And yet the D.C. Circuit
concluded that it was.
What makes National Association of Manufacaturers significant
is this conclusion. As others have noted, the First Amendment oper-
ates as a rule and, like other rules, has a particular scope.27 Some
770 (1976).
23. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (“[I]n virtually
all our commercial speech decisions to date, we have emphasized that ... disclosure require-
ments trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than do flat prohibitions on
speech.”).
24. See id. at 650-51 & n.14 (stating that required disclosure of “purely factual and uncon-
troversial information” need only be “reasonably related” to state interests).
25. 325 F.3d 360, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Once again, the court was discussing the effect of
section 8(c), which it said “ ‘implements the First Amendment’ in the labor relations area.” Id.
(quoting NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969)).
26. Id. (internal citations omitted).
27. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
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activities are within the scope of the First Amendment, and others
are outside it.28 Some speech has long been thought to be outside the
scope of the First Amendment, such as insider trading, securities
fraud, antitrust violations, criminal solicitation, various forms of
conspiracies, and other inchoate crimes.29 In addition, for those ac-
tivities within the scope of the First Amendment, some receive a
high degree of protection, and some receive a lower degree. Since
1976, for example, commercial speech has been within the scope of
the First Amendment,30 but some commercial speech receives “inter-
mediate” protection31—lower than that received by, say, political
speech—and other commercial speech receives no protection at all.32
The legal exercise of distinguishing cases concerns the scope of
rules. To say that the Notice Posting Rule can be distinguished from
the Pledge of Allegiance is to say that a court could conclude that
they do not fall under the same rule.33 A court could conclude that
both fall within the scope of the First Amendment, but that the
Pledge falls under a more protective First Amendment rule than the
Notice. More drastically, a court could conclude that the Pledge falls
within the scope of the First Amendment, while the Notice falls
outside of it entirely. This is what it means to say that the cases can
be distinguished.
The fact that the D.C. Circuit did none of these things says some-
thing about the current state of First Amendment law. As others
have observed, litigants are raising First Amendment claims when
earlier they never would have done so.34 Beyond that, courts often
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2004).
28. See id.
29. See id. at 1770-71.
30. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
31. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2674 (2011) (noting that the Supreme
Court “has applied a less than strict, ‘intermediate’ First Amendment test when the
government directly restricts commercial speech”).
32. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980) (“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages
that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may ban forms
of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”).
33. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING 58 (2009) (“In practice, a great deal of legal argument involves the attempt
by one side to claim that some higher court case controls the result in the instant case, while
the other side insists that there is a sufficient distinction between the two that the outcome
in the precedent case need not be the outcome in the instant case.”).
34. See e.g., Neil Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. &
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entertain these claims, thus implying that they may fall somewhere
within the First Amendment’s scope. But this case goes further still.
Not only was the First Amendment invoked, not only did the court
find it relevant, but the court concluded that the employers had
raised a successful claim. Nor is that conclusion a fluke. This case
did not go to the Supreme Court because the Board decided not to
seek certiorari, presumably out of concern that it would lose.35 Not
only was the First Amendment raised, not only was the case within
its scope, but the protection given appeared to be of the highest
level, on par with that offered in Barnette. Given the opportunities
for distinguishing the two cases, the fact that the D.C. Circuit
decided instead to place them together says something about how
wide and robust the First Amendment’s operation has become.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT OPPORTUNISM
If one accepts this portrait of First Amendment expansionism, the
natural impulse is to try to analyze it. Like the expansion itself, the
task of understanding the expansion begins with the legal claims
being made.
Claims like those of the National Association of Manufacturers
reflect what Fred Schauer has called “First Amendment opportun-
ism.”36 As a descriptive matter, the term “First Amendment oppor-
tunism” suggests that, at an earlier time, such claims would not
have been made at all, or if they had, they would have met with
derision.37 Their flourishing suggests a certain entrepreneurialism
in the deployment of the First Amendment in disputes that previ-
ously took place on other terms, if at all.38
MARY L. REV. 1501 (2015); Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment
Coverage, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613 (2015).
35. Press Release, NLRB, The NLRB’s Notice Posting Rule (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.
nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrbs-notice-posting-rule [http://perma.cc/
E44X-PWV2].
36. Schauer, supra note 1, at 175.
37. See Schauer, supra note 34.
38. Schauer, supra note 1, at 191 (“In numerous other instances, political, social, cultural,
ideological, economic, and moral claims that are far wider than the First Amendment, and
that appear to have no special philosophical or historical affinity with the First Amendment,
find themselves transmogrified into First Amendment arguments.”).
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Of course, litigation itself could be understood as entrepreneurial,
and the fact that these claims are being made suggests that claim-
ants have incentives to make them.39 In cases such as National
Association of Manufacturers, the incentives are obvious. Employers
and their trade groups want to avoid regulation, which they perceive
as costly and sometimes misdirected. Businesses want to be left
alone to make their own decisions, and the First Amendment is a
tool that can create legal purchase for this interest.
The First Amendment is not, however, the only tool that can be,
or has been, employed in this regard. In the early twentieth century,
businesses articulated similar antiregulatory sentiment in other
terms. This was the Lochner era, a period of antiregulatory constitu-
tionalism epitomized by the Supreme Court’s decision in Lochner v.
New York.40 In this period, antiregulatory impulses took the form of
a constitutional claim to liberty of contract. But in their structure,
the claims of the past resemble those of the present. In the Lochner
era, business interests claimed a liberty-based immunity from cer-
tain forms of government regulation, such as minimum wage and
maximum hours laws.41 Free speech claimants like the National
Association of Manufacturers now claim a liberty-based immunity
from certain forms of government regulation—in this case, the re-
quired disclosure of the very labor laws that now govern the employ-
ment relationship.42 More broadly, litigants claim immunity from
laws regulating commercial conditions such as employee safety43
39. Id. (“When there is a good argument to be had, whether it is the First Amendment or
not, those who would benefit from its acceptance are likely to use it, both in court and in
public discourse.”).
40. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The parallels between the modern First Amendment and
Lochnerism have been identified and deeply explored. For trenchant examples, see J.M.
Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment,
1990 Duke L.J. 375, 389; Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech:
Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1979); Schauer,
supra note 1, at 191; Schauer, supra note 34; Louis Michael Seidman, The Dale Problem:
Property and Speech Under the Regulatory State, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1541, 1544-45 (2008).
41. See, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57, 64 (striking down a law limiting bakers’ work to ten
hours per day and sixty hours per week). 
42. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 19.
43. Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1125-26, 1128, 1134 (C.D. Cal.
2013) (holding that an adult entertainment group stated a claim when it argued that a con-
dom requirement in pornography production may violate performers’ free speech rights and
constitute invalid prior restraint but denying preliminary injunction).
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and benefits;44 the location45 and organization46 of businesses; the
composition and labeling of foodstuffs,47 drugs,48 and commercial
products;49 and the treatment of customers.50 These claims mirror
44. See, e.g., Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, 929 F. Supp. 2d 402, 441-42 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (reject-
ing a claim by a for-profit business that providing contraceptive coverage to employees under
the Affordable Care Act violates its right against compelled subsidy of speech); O’Brien v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1166 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (rejecting claim
by for-profit business that providing contraceptive coverage to employees under the Affordable
Care Act violated right against compelled expressive conduct).
45. Foley v. Orange Cnty., No. 6:12-CV-269-ORL-37, 2013 WL 4110414, at *12 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 13, 2013) (rejecting a First Amendment claim that compliance with land use special
exception procedure amounts to compelled speech); Demarest v. City of Leavenworth, 876 F.
Supp. 2d 1186, 1197 (E.D. Wash. 2012) (rejecting claim that zoning rule mandating signs in
a “Bavarian theme” violates First Amendment); Coleman v. City of Mesa, 284 P.3d 863, 871
(Ariz. 2012) (concluding that a denial of zoning permit to a tattoo parlor triggered First
Amendment intermediate scrutiny).
46. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 634 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (declining to address Verizon’s
First Amendment claims against net neutrality regulation while holding for Verizon on other
grounds); Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc.,10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 443-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding
that results of a Chinese search engine’s algorithms are entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion).
47. See, e.g., Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc);
Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 746 F.3d 1065, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc
granted and opinion vacated by No. 13-5281, 2014 WL2619836 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 4, 2014),
judgment reinstated by 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc); Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v.
Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1996) (granting preliminary injunction on First Amendment
grounds against a Vermont law requiring labeling of milk from cows treated with synthetic
growth hormone); Monster Beverage Corp. v. Herrera, No. EDCV 13-00786-VAP, 2013 WL
4573959, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013) (denying motion to dismiss First Amendment
challenges to City Attorney’s labeling demands for highly caffeinated energy drinks).
48. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2012) (striking down FDA
regulations forbidding drug manufacturers to market prescription drugs to doctors for nonap-
proved uses).
49. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (striking down
law requiring producers to disclose whether minerals and mineral products are “conflict-
free”); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (striking down law
requiring graphic warnings on cigarette labels); CTIA-Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of S.F.,
494 F. App’x 752, 754 (9th Cir. 2012) (striking down requirement that cell phones be accom-
panied by warning information); United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1,
26 (D.D.C. 2012) (rejecting claim that corrective statements required of tobacco companies
violated First Amendment); In re Bisphenol-A (BPA) Polycarbonate Plastic Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 08-1967MD-W-ODS, 2009 WL 3762965, at *5 n.4 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 9, 2009) (rejecting claim
that tort failure-to-warn claim violates First Amendment rights of defendants).
50. See, e.g., Conn. Bar Ass’n v. United States, 620 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2010) (rejecting
First Amendment challenge to Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act’s
requirements that debt relief agencies provide bankruptcy clients with certain disclosures and
written contracts); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2014) (rejecting
claim that state nondiscrimination law violated photography company’s First Amendment
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Lochner-era claims in their structure: they posit a constitutional
right, held by business interests (be they sole proprietors or corpo-
rate entities), which immunizes them from government regulation, 
often regulation that relies upon state interests in public health,
safety, and welfare.
The difference today is that the First Amendment is so often the
designated vehicle for these antiregulatory impulses. But this, too,
is not surprising. As constitutional rights go, the First Amendment
speech right provides an unusually robust amount of protection for
activities that fall within its ambit. If a litigant can squeeze her
claims under the First Amendment umbrella, the rewards are
great—certainly much better than the rational basis review afforded
to economic regulation in the post-Lochner era. 
Moreover, this robust protection is given to something called “the
freedom of speech.” Many activities involve “speech” in some way.
This truism only becomes truer in an information economy, where
many activities and products involve communication. Even if “the
freedom of speech” should turn out to mean something different
from “speech,” a First Amendment claim may look more facially
plausible to a litigant than, say, a Fourth Amendment claim when
no arguable search has taken place, or a Second Amendment claim
that does not involve guns.
Thus, the First Amendment offers strong protection at a seem-
ingly low price of admission. The incentives are clear. Just as ketch-
up can suddenly look like a vegetable to a strapped USDA,51 so too
can general antiregulatory sentiment suddenly look like a speech
claim to any litigant who can remotely characterize her activity as
one that involves communication. A bit of speech, like a dab of
tomato sauce, puts one in a whole new category.
rights by requiring it to serve same-sex customers).
51. See National School Lunch, School Breakfast, and Child Care Food Programs; Meal
Pattern Requirements, 46 Fed. Reg. 44,452, 44,455-56 (Sept. 4, 1981) (proposing that
“vegetable and fruit concentrates” count as full servings of vegetables and that schools “could
credit a condiment such as pickle relish as a vegetable”); Who Deserves a Break Today?,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 21, 1981, at 43 (describing widespread interpretation of regulations as
counting ketchup as a vegetable and reactions thereto).
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IV. FIRST AMENDMENT EXPANSIONISM
That incentives exist for First Amendment opportunism, however,
does not explain its success. Granted, the questions of why a claim is
brought and why it is successful are related. The more successful a
litigant predicts a claim to be, the more likely she is to make it. But
there is enough distance between litigants’ decisions to make claims
and courts’ decisions to grant them that the two phenomena are
worth distinguishing. After all, not everything that is opportunistic
is also successful; naked opportunism often fails.52 Why has First
Amendment opportunism led to First Amendment expansionism?
There are many possible reasons, not all of which will be can-
vassed here. Some have suggested a cultural argument, wherein
widespread societal support for the First Amendment gives it an
inherent leg up on other constitutional arguments and perhaps
discourages public officials from being perceived as “against” it.53
Some would say that this is a more specifically political phenome-
non: that what matters is who is making the First Amendment
claim, or which judges are hearing it. Supporters of this view could
point to the fact that the notice upheld by the D.C. Circuit in UAW-
Labor Employment & Training Corp. v. Chao informed workers that
they did not have to join a union or pay certain dues,54 whereas the
notice struck down by the D.C. Circuit in National Association of
Manufacturers told workers about their pro-union rights, as well as
their rights not to join.55 Some would argue that the divergent out-
comes in the two cases come down to the divergent substance of the
notices.
Others would say that First Amendment doctrine itself contrib-
utes to the problem, because it does not give clear guidance to
52. See, e.g., Ketchup Not a Vegetable, Administration Decides, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB.,
Sept. 26, 1981, at 16-A.
53. See Robert C. Post, Community and the First Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 474
(1997) (“The absence of a coherent structure, however, has not prevented the First
Amendment from becoming the object of veneration. Who can possibly be opposed to it? Like
community, therefore, the First Amendment carries a high and positive emotional valence.”);
Schauer, supra note 1, at 192.
54. 325 F.3d 360, 362 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
55. 717 F.3d 947, 950 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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litigants or courts.56 First Amendment doctrine is rife with special-
ized tests governing particular types of speech, and different tests
may arguably apply to the same speech. For a lower court genuinely
trying to understand and apply Supreme Court case law, it may be
difficult to decide whether, for example, a required disclosure
regarding a commercial product merits rational basis review, inter-
mediate scrutiny for commercial speech, or the same strict scrutiny
applied in political speech cases such as Barnette.57 This lack of
clarity is heightened by courts’ tendencies to speak in general terms
about protection for “speech” without making clear what specific
speech category they are addressing, or what particular principle is
in play.58
First Amendment doctrine, however, is intrinsically related to
First Amendment theory, and theory makes its own contributions
to First Amendment expansionism. The phrase “the freedom of
speech” is, of course, not self-executing. It must mean something
different from “freedom for all speech-related activities,” and every-
one has his or her own intuitive example of speech not included
within “the freedom of speech,” be it blackmail, fraud, or the nutri-
tional information on a box of cereal. “The freedom of speech” means
something other than freedom for all speech, and to understand
what it encompasses requires a theory—an explanation of why the
activities within the scope of “the freedom of speech” deserve to be
treated differently from those outside of it.59 Any decision about
56. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 267, 278 (1991) (“[F]irst amendment doctrine is neither clear nor logical. It is a vast
Sargasso Sea of drifting and entangled values, theories, rules, exceptions, predilections. It
requires determined interpretive effort to derive a useful set of constitutional principles by
which to evaluate regulations of expression.”).
57. Compare Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en
banc) (applying rational basis review while also attempting to explain the standard as a
version of intermediate scrutiny), with Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 717 F.3d at 957 (implying through
analogies to Barnette and Wooley that strict scrutiny applied). 
58. See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence,
88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2373 (2000) (noting “the tendency of courts to speak of First Amend-
ment rules as applying to speech generally, thus systematically effacing the domains of speech
actually implicated by different First Amendment theories”).
59. See, e.g., Lawrence Alexander & Paul Horton, The Impossibility of a Free Speech
Principle, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1319, 1320-21 (1983); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifi-
cations, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 125 (1989); Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78
NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1289 (1983).
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whether an activity falls within the First Amendment’s ambit, or
how much protection it receives, ultimately comes back to some
theory of what the First Amendment is for.60
One could observe that First Amendment theories are numerous,
that courts employ them with differing levels of consistency and
awareness, and that individual judges may endorse different theo-
ries. One could make arguments for why any of these factors might
contribute to First Amendment expansionism. I would suggest that
the problem for First Amendment theory is even more intractable.
It has to do with two things: the nature of speech and the nature of
rules.
A. Speech
The first point is one about a clash between semantics and the
normative demands of the First Amendment. As previously
observed, countless activities involve “speech.”61 These include pro-
fessional advice from doctors and lawyers, legal documents and
testimony, instruction manuals from product manufacturers, labels
on food products, campaign spending, flag burning, tattoos, the
production and distribution of pornography, work produced by
machines such as Internet search results, work produced by people
now dead, activities undertaken by infants and minors, and so on.
“Freedom of speech” is a term of art that does not refer to all speech
activities, but rather designates some area of activity that society
takes, for some reason, to have special importance.62 The judgment
that a particular activity has this importance is a normative judg-
ment, and the category “the freedom of speech” is a normative cate-
gory. But the category the “freedom of speech” refers to “speech”—a
term as to which people have an understanding that has nothing to
do with values or principles. Instead, they have a semantic under-
60. Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5
(1989) (“A theory of free speech is thus a theory that posits a rationale, or justification, or
goal, in terms other than free speaking, and then maintains that freedom to speak, or write,
or communicate, will promote that posited rationale, justification, or goal.... Freedom of
speech is thus ordinarily seen instrumentally, as the vehicle for promoting some supposed pri-
mary, or at least more fundamental, value.”).
61. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
62. Schauer, supra note 60, at 5.
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standing of the term as referring to many real-world phenomena
(and not to others). Thus the stage is set for a struggle over the
relationship between “speech” and “the freedom of speech.”
This struggle plays a role in First Amendment expansionism.
Courts rarely see First Amendment challenges to laws that have
nothing to do with the phenomenon “speech.” This is despite the fact
that the First Amendment forbids laws “abridging the freedom of
speech,”63 and many non-speech-related laws do just that. Real
property laws, for example, greatly reduce the speech opportunities
of non-property holders. Yet property laws, although occasionally
implicated in free speech law, are not a locus of First Amendment
opportunism, let alone successful expansion.64 Even something so
seemingly irrelevant as the DMV’s driving license criteria help de-
termine who can make it to the library and who cannot. As Larry
Alexander has said, “[A]ll laws affect what gets said, by whom, to
whom, and with what effect.”65 This is not to say that all such effects
rise to the level of “abridg[ing]” the freedom of speech. But it does
suggest that, if First Amendment expansionism were completely
divorced from the real world phenomenon of “speech,” it would be
more evenly distributed among all regulations—those that explicitly
involve “speech” and those than do not. Instead, the fact that a regu-
lation does not concern “speech” on its face seems to make it much
less likely to become a target of review in the name of “the freedom
of speech.”
Meanwhile, when a regulation does involve “speech” in the collo-
quial sense, courts seem more likely to conclude that it also involves
“the freedom of speech.” National Association of Manufacturers is an
example,66 as are challenges to consumer labeling requirements.67
From a theoretical perspective, it is difficult to identify a conception
of “the freedom of speech” that would make such requirements
63. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
64. See Amalgamated Food Emps. Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968)
(recognizing a First Amendment right to picket in a privately owned shopping center),
overruled by Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (rejecting First Amendment right to
distribute handbills in privately owned shopping center) and Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507
(1976) (rejecting First Amendment right to picket in a privately owned shopping center).
65. Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and Free
Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 929 (1993).
66. 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
67. See supra notes 47 and 49.
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constitutionally suspect. If the value that justifies “the freedom of
speech” is the search for truth, then requiring employers and
manufacturers to supply true information hardly seems to offend
this value.68 If anything, the search for truth would seem to argue
in favor of such disclosures. Indeed, the primary reason that the
Supreme Court gave commercial speech First Amendment protec-
tion was out of concern that suppression of commercial speech might
deprive listeners of valuable information, including information
related to political decision making.69 This concern is notably absent
when a law requires information sharing, rather than banning it.
If the value underlying “the freedom of speech” is individual
autonomy, employers and manufacturers may cast themselves as
unwilling speakers whose autonomy rights are being violated. But
this claim would fail under many comprehensive theories of free
speech autonomy.70 Generally speaking, the overriding aim of the
commercial sphere is typically profit maximization, rather than
pursuit of a particular individual’s personal commitments or prefer-
ences.71 Within the employment relationship in particular, neither
employers nor employees may pursue their personal interests
without regard for the duties they undertake by virtue of their role
within the workplace. They may not sexually harass, or even gossip
about, colleagues without facing potential discipline, despite the fact
that these rules constrain their freedom to speak as they wish.
68. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment
Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1995) (discussing the “canonized” view that the First
Amendment furthers the search for truth and noting criticisms of this view); Eugene Volokh,
In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas / Search for Truth as a Theory of Free Speech Protec-
tion, 97 VA. L. REV. 595 (2011) (arguing that the search for truth should count as an important
justification for the First Amendment, along with democratic participation).
69. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763-
64 (1976) (noting consumer and societal interests in commercial information); Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975) (noting legitimate informational interests in advertisement
for abortion services in another state).
70. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 273
(2011) (“The structural compulsion of the market means that neither liberty nor autonomy
is at stake, at least to the extent this sphere works according to its ideal. (Autonomy may exist
in respect to a person’s choice of the entity for which to work—but not the entity’s behavior.)”); 
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST. COM-
MENT. 283, 296 (2011) (developing a thinker-based, autonomy-centered view of free speech
which would distinguish employer speech because “business corporate speech does not involve
in any direct or straightforward fashion the revelation of individuals’ mental contents”). 
71. See Shiffrin, supra note 70, at 296-97.
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Meanwhile, manufacturers clearly have duties to provide consumers
with information about their products, including how they work,
what potentially dangerous substances they contain, and how not
to use them. These duties are undergirded by tort liability for
failure to warn about dangerous products, an area of law so far
seemingly immune to First Amendment expansionism, if not entire-
ly opportunism.72
If the First Amendment’s justification goes back to democratic
self-governance, these cases seem equally mystifying. Whether one’s
view of political speech is narrow73 or broad,74 the employment rela-
tionship would seem to be one where employers and employees owe
duties to behave differently to each other than they would in their
capacities purely as citizens. And if one were to argue that the
employment relationship or food labeling remains within the scope
of the First Amendment, providing factual information would only
seem to foster democratic self-governance, not to hinder it. 
Meanwhile, if one argument for the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion in
National Association of Manufacturers is that speech compulsions
may be employed by the government to target those with politically
disfavored views, there is nothing special about speech compulsions
in this regard. The government could target disfavored views
through means having nothing to do with “speech”—through taxa-
tion, heavier general regulation, or selective prosecution, for
example. Meanwhile, disclosure requirements may serve any num-
ber of legitimate purposes having nothing to do with penalizing
viewpoints.75 There seems little reason to conclude that such
requirements in particular are presumptively suspect, unless the
72. See In re Bisphenol-A (BPA) Polycarbonate Plastic Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1967,
2009 WL 3762965, at *6 n.4 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 9, 2009) (rejecting an argument that a tort
failure-to-warn claim violates First Amendment rights of defendants).
73. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.
REV. 1, 27-28 (1971) (defining speech protected by the First Amendment as “speech about how
we are governed”).
74. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 483 (2011)
(describing “public discourse” as guiding First Amendment value); James Weinstein, Partici-
patory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491,
493 (2011) (arguing the same).
75. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 368 (2010) (stating that disclosure laws
provide citizens with useful information, ensure they are fully informed, and prevent confu-
sion).
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fact that they involve “speech” is driving that conclusion.76 All in all,
any argument for the relevance of “the freedom of speech” to product
labeling or employer disclosure is far from obvious or inevitable. Nor
do judicial opinions in this arena tend to rely on subtlety. Instead,
they seem animated by “speech”—by the fact that these materials
are made of words. 
Perhaps, then, courts are less likely to identify “the freedom of
speech” as a value in the absence of “speech” in a regulation, and
more likely to conclude that “the freedom of speech” is implicated in
the presence of “speech.” Nor is this result necessarily unreasonable.
There must be some overlap between the two, or else “the freedom
of speech” would be called something else. And once one admits
some correspondence between “the freedom of speech” and “speech,”
it may be difficult to say with confidence where that correspondence
ends. For some, concluding that the First Amendment obviously
does not apply to some form of “speech” may be as unlikely as
concluding that “No Vehicles in the Park” obviously does not include
motorcycles or dunebuggies.77 
B. Rules
One might observe, however, that it is the job of courts not to
mistake terms of art for everyday language, and if the definition of
“the freedom of speech” were clear enough, they would not do so. No
doubt there is much truth to this, and no doubt, too, we will never
reach that blissful state.78 But even if we did, one problem would
76. One might respond that compulsory disclosure has previously been used to target
disfavored groups, as was fairly plainly the case in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958). This historical precedent might support the conclusion that compelled
disclosure is presumptively unconstitutional. But this argument would ignore the fact that
other forms of regulation have also historically been used to target disfavored groups. See, e.g.,
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (striking down Louisiana Governor Huey
Long’s special tax on newspapers with circulations of greater than 20,000). The NAACP itself
endured numerous forms of regulatory targeting. See, e.g., Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
at 451-54 (describing application of Alabama foreign corporations law and rules of contempt
to NAACP). On the role of suspect purpose in compelled disclosure analysis, see Leslie
Kendrick, Disclosure and Its Discontents, 27 J.L. & POL. 575, 575-76 (2012).
77. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
607 (1958); see also Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1109, 1134 (2008).
78. Bork, supra note 73, at 20 (“The law has settled upon no tenable, internally consistent
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remain—this one a problem about the nature of rules rather than
the nature of speech. 
When it comes to the scope of the First Amendment, there are
only two clear rules: either no speech is covered, or all speech is
covered. Every other position is somewhere in the mushy middle.
The first clear rule—no speech is covered—suggests that speech is
not distinguishable from other activities, or that “the freedom of
speech” is not distinguishable from some other freedom that covers
a broader range of activities. This position, while it garners some
support in the theoretical literature,79 seems unlikely to be adopted
as a tenet of constitutional law.
The second clear rule, that all speech is covered, is sometimes
called the “all-inclusive approach.”80 This may seem equally unpal-
atable. After all, everyone has intuitive examples of speech that sim-
ply cannot receive First Amendment protection. Any rule that all
speech is covered must involve a heavy amount of defining out,
presumably by employing some sort of test to conclude that while all
speech is nominally within the scope of the First Amendment, some
of it ultimately receives little to no protection.
But this option must be compared with the alternatives. Any the-
ory of free speech falling between “no coverage” and “all coverage”
will be nuanced and complex. This is certainly true of any pluralistic
theory, which identifies multiple purposes that freedom of speech
serves.81 It is also true of any unified theory, which assigns impor-
tance only to one value, such as the search for truth or democratic
participation.82 Even if only one value is involved, a theory must
account for all of the different activities in the world that serve that
value and how they relate to “the freedom of speech.” Such a theory
should probably also explain how various activities that involve
“speech” in the everyday sense either do or do not further the chosen
theory of the scope of the constitutional guarantee of free speech.”).
79. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? (2005);
Alexander & Horton, supra note 59, at 21-22; Schauer, supra note 59, at 1290-91.
80. Weinstein, supra note 74, at 491-92 (identifying examples of the “all-inclusive
approach” in treatises and other literature).
81. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 9-14 (1992);
STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 9-45 (1990);
Greenawalt, supra note 59, at 119-20.
82. For a survey of various unified theories of the First Amendment, see FREDERICK
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982).
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value, and thus how they do or do not relate to “the freedom of
speech.” Certainly courts are going to want to know the answer to
this question when faced with applying “the freedom of speech” to
particular activities. 
Even at their best, such theories will involve complexity, they will
involve nuance, and they will go on for pages. At their worst, given
all the innumerable things that speech does, and all the ways that
particular values either are or are not furthered by speech activities,
listening to somebody else’s First Amendment theory can be roughly
as interesting and illuminating as listening to someone recount a
dream over the breakfast table. As Henry James said, “Tell a dream,
lose a reader.”83 
Any actual First Amendment theory, then, will function as more
of a standard than a rule. Even the hardest and clearest theory will
require much explication to reduce it to the level of particular
activities in particular disputes. Rather than deal with these com-
plexities, some courts and some scholars opt for the “all-inclusive
approach.” They prefer defining out to defining in. The all-inclusive
approach cannot avoid the difficult questions: some activities will
have to be defined out, and some set of values will have to govern
that process. But it feels clearer and easier to start with the pre-
sumption that everything is in and work from there. And along the
way one may conclude that the easiest course is just to leave the
Board notice, the tattoos, and the food labels in after all.
Of course, it need not be thus. European courts, for example, seem
quite happy with standards, as do some American judges. But for
many American courts, rules seem to exert a magnetic pull. Theo-
rists who are working to develop a comprehensive First Amendment
theory not only have their work cut out for them generally, but they
are fighting against this pull. Even the world’s best First Amend-
ment theory would still have to contend with judges’ desire for what
Learned Hand described, in the context of subversive speech, as “a
qualitative formula, hard, conventional, difficult to evade.”84 And if
83. See MARTIN AMIS, Review of Ulysses by James Joyce, in THE WAR AGAINST CLICHÉ:
ESSAYS AND REVIEWS, 1971-2000, at 446 (2001) (quoting Henry James).
84. Letter from Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr., (Jan. 2, 1921), in REASON AND
IMAGINATION, THE SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE OF LEARNED HAND: 1897-1961, at 103 (Con-
stance Jordan ed., 2013); see also Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern
First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 725 (1975)
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this pull exerts itself in the First Amendment context, it is likely, at
least at this point, to pull toward “all coverage” rather than “no cov-
erage.”
First Amendment expansionism is likely a product of many fac-
tors. It does, however, highlight challenges intrinsic in formulating
and propagating a workable understanding of “the freedom of
speech.” The pull of both everyday language and clear rules under-
cuts the best efforts to bring a full conception of the First Amend-
ment to legal decision making. Such a conception—one which can
comprehensively explain the relationship between “speech” and “the
freedom of speech”—is precisely what courts need to address the
diverse and often novel claims that First Amendment opportunism
brings their way. It is a paradox that a complex understanding of
the First Amendment is simultaneously exactly what legal decision
making requires, and exactly what it shuns.
(applying Learned Hand’s words in a First Amendment context).
       
